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I. INTRODUCTION
During the fall of 1918, the “Spanish Flu” swept through the United States.2
More than 25 percent of the United States population became ill.3  The Spanish Flu killed 
2.5 percent of those infected.4  In a normal flu year, only one-tenth of 1 percent of flu 
victims die.5 Estimates of the total number of deaths from the Spanish Flu world-wide 
range from 20 million to more than 100 million.6  If a similar pandemic7 occurred today, 
with a similar mortality rate, 1.5 million Americans would die.8
In addition to the human costs, there are significant economic consequences that 
would follow from an influenza pandemic similar to the Spanish flu pandemic. The 
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 The label “Spanish Flu” is most likely a misnomer.  Most epidemiologists and public health experts now 
believe that the pandemic influenza of 1918 originated in Kansas, or possibly in China.  JOHN M. BARRY, 
THE GREAT INFLUENZA, 452-56 (Viking 2004).  The moniker “Spanish flu” came about because there was 
heavy press censorship in 1917 and 1918 of anything that could be construed as detrimental to public 
morale and the war effort in World War I in the United States and most of Europe.  Therefore, the 
American and most of the European press failed to report the alarming number of persons stricken with the 
flu and the high mortality rate associated with it.  Id. at 171.  Spain did not censor its press heavily during 
this time.  Therefore, the first reports of what became the influenza pandemic came from Spain, giving rise 
to the moniker of “Spanish flu” for the disease that was sweeping the world.  GINA KOLATA, FLU, 10
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1999).
3 GINA KOLATA, FLU, 6 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1999)
4 Id. at 7.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7
 A pandemic is an epidemic of unusual extent and severity, occurring over a wide geographic area and 
affecting an exceptionally high proportion of the population.  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY (UNABRIDGED) at 1629 (2002).
8 KOLATA, supra note 3, at 7.
2United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (hereinafter, the CDC)
estimates that the direct and indirect medical costs in the United States associated with a 
“medium-level” influenza pandemic would range from $71 billion to $167 billion.9
Influenza pandemics occur with some regularity, although they are usually not as deadly 
as the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic.  The Asian influenza pandemic of 1957 and the Hong 
Kong influenza pandemic of 1968 were not as deadly as the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, 
but did engender high rates of social disruption.10  Virtually all experts agree that it is not 
a question of if another influenza pandemic as deadly as the Spanish flu will occur, but a 
question of when.11
How will the nation’s hospitals cope with a pandemic of this nature?  Even if they
can cope with the immediate impact of the pandemic, will they survive the ordeal?  Will 
they act in the best interests of the public’s health, even if it causes them economic 
injury?  Or will they follow the old adage that “those who turn and run away, live to fight 
another day,” and protect their bottom lines, even if it means a less-than-optimal response 
to a public health emergency such as a pandemic? How can we ensure that hospitals 
comply with, rather than defy, orders of public health authorities that may be adverse to 
their economic interests during the next pandemic or other public health emergency?
Most hospitals in the United States are privately owned, and an increasing number of 
them are investor-owned for-profit enterprises.12  The shift from non-profit to for-profit 
status, coupled with the fragmented manner in which we finance health care in this 
9
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10 Id. at 1, fn. 3.
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3country, necessitate consideration of issues of cost and compensation in advance of a 
public health emergency.13  A plan for ensuring the economic viability of hospitals and 
for allocating financial responsibility for the hospitals during and after a pandemic among 
government entities and the private sector is of utmost importance.14
This article discusses the likely economic consequences of a naturally occurring
infectious disease pandemic on our nation’s hospitals and how to ensure that they act to
benefit the public during such a pandemic, without forcing them to incur irreparable
economic damage.15  Recent examples of provider behavior during limited outbreaks of 
infectious disease demonstrate that monetary assurances sufficient to ensure a health care 
provider’s survival, both during and after such an outbreak, are crucial to ensuring quick 
and complete compliance with the orders of local public health officials. Despite the 
evidence that provider worries about economic survival hamper the efforts of public 
health officials to protect the public’s health, current law does not provide adequate 
assurances to health care providers that they will emerge from a public health emergency 
relatively unscathed.  Although numerous public health emergency legal preparedness 
plans exist or are under development, they fail to address the fundamental question of 
how our health care system will survive a public health emergency that is all but certain 
to occur.16
13 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, INSTITUTE FOR 
BIOETHICS, HEALTH POLICY AND LAW, QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION:  LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS 11 
(November 2003).
14 Id.
15
 Although much of the discussion in this article would apply to an infectious disease outbreak caused by a 
bioterror attack, the article’s focus is on the consequences of naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious 
disease.
16
 As of this writing, public health officials around the world are closely monitoring a strain of avian 
influenza, or “bird flu,” that has infected approximately 175 people in Asia, Turkey, and Iraq with a 
mortality rate of 54%.  WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF CONFIRMED HUMAN 
CASES OF AVIAN INFLUENZA A/(H5N1) REPORTED TO WHO,  
4Unless the law provides assurances that compliance with the orders of public 
health officials will not constitute economic suicide for hospitals, we are unlikely to get 
quick and complete cooperation from them in containing a developing infectious disease 
pandemic.  Failure of our first-line responders to comply with the orders of public health 
officials could prove disastrous to any effort to protect the public from outbreaks of 
infectious disease.
Part II of this article explores the likely economic effects of an infectious disease 
pandemic on our nation’s health care providers, both during and after the emergency.  
Using examples of provider behavior from the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1917-1918, the 
more recent outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in several 
countries around the world in 2002-2003, and an isolated outbreak of monkeypox in the 
American mid-west in 2003, this discussion demonstrates the need for economic 
assurances for hospitals and medical staff to ensure that they act in the best interests of 
the public during an outbreak of infectious disease.
Part III demonstrates that existing law fails to address the economic needs of 
hospitals dealing with a pandemic. New legislation, and reinterpretation of existing law, 
are needed to ensure that money is available to compensate hospitals not only for the
direct costs of providing care to pandemic victims during an outbreak, but also for the 
losses hospitals will incur by refraining from providing other care during a pandemic, and 
for the lingering economic damage they will experience because of the social stigma of 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2006_03_06  (last visited March 7, 
2006).   If this virus becomes transmissible from person to person, it could become a pandemic even more 
deadly than the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic.  See Marc Santora, When a Bug Becomes a Monster, N.Y. 
TIMES, August 21, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/21/nyregion/21pandemic.html
5having been designated as an isolation or quarantine center by public health authorities
during a pandemic.
Part IV of the article proposes that we provide legal assurances to the nation’s 
hospitals that they will survive the economic effects of a pandemic.  These assurances 
include creation of a fund earmarked to compensate hospitals for the direct costs of 
caring for pandemic victims, legislating a partnership between the federal government
and the private insurance industry designed to offset losses that will be caused by 
disruption of the normal system of health care financing engendered by a pandemic, and 
re-interpreting the Takings Clause to compensate hospitals for their losses to goodwill 
due to their compliance with the orders of public health officials during a pandemic.  
These proposals will align the interests of hospitals with those of the public during an 
infectious disease pandemic, ensuring that hospitals will be fully compensated if they 
fulfill their roles as guardians of the public health during an infectious disease pandemic, 
and that our hospitals will emerge intact after the pandemic is over.
II. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AN INFECTIOUS DISEASE 
PANDEMIC ON THE NATION’S HOSPITALS
Although it is impossible to predict precisely how a pandemic will impact 
American hospitals, it is indisputable that a pandemic will have both an immediate 
impact on hospital finances, and a lingering negative economic effect that could be even 
more devastating in the long-term. At the very minimum, adequate preparation for a 
pandemic must include financial incentives designed to encourage hospitals to act 
contrary to their long and short-term financial interests in favor of the immediate health 
needs of the general public. 
A. The Immediate Economic Impact of a Pandemic on Hospitals.
6When we think of hospitals’ costs of responding to a pandemic, we think of the 
direct costs of using hospitals and their associated medical personnel to isolate and care 
for sick individuals.  Isolation of sick individuals, and quarantine of healthy individuals 
who may have been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease, have been used to 
control the spread of disease since the earliest recorded human history.17  Nevertheless, a 
historical review of the costs incurred by hospitals in caring for isolated and quarantined 
individuals during an infectious disease outbreak has limited, if any, value in helping us 
determine what costs hospitals will incur should a pandemic occur today. Until the 
discovery of antibiotics in the mid-20th century, people were relatively helpless to treat 
infectious disease.  Therefore, it was not necessary to isolate sick individuals in a place 
where they could receive skilled medical care, such as the equivalent of the modern 
hospital. At the most, isolated persons suffering from infectious disease were offered 
palliative care, which required little medical skill or technology.18 Rather than using 
hospital-like facilities, isolation and quarantine were generally enforced in the location 
where the infected or exposed person first appeared within the jurisdiction of the officials 
charged with isolation and quarantine authority, such as on an arriving ship.19  Even when 
hospital facilities were used for isolation, as they were for persons debarking from ships 
in New York City in the 19th century, they were usually facilities specially dedicated to
isolation and palliative care, rather than active treatment of disease.20 Places that were 
17 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 13, at 17.
18 Id. at 19.
19 Id. at 17-19.
20 Id.
7used to isolate patients suffering from infectious disease were generally known as 
“pesthouses,” and were avoided by upstanding citizens at all costs.21
Some of the earliest uses of general hospital facilities in the United States for 
isolation of sick patients occurred during the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918.  For 
example, San Francisco’s first case of Spanish flu was reported in the newspaper on 
September 24, 1918.22  On October 14, 1918 the chief of San Francisco’s Board of Health 
met with the superintendents of the city’s hospitals.23  They decided to move all of the 
patients who were not suffering from Spanish flu out of the San Francisco Hospital, and 
use it to isolate Spanish flu patients.24  Ultimately, the San Francisco Hospital admitted 
3,509 pandemic victims, and 26% of them died.25
The Spanish flu epidemic occurred at a time when the United States was 
beginning to experience the development of general acute care hospitals.  Nevertheless, 
there are a number of differences between the Spanish flu pandemic and any future 
pandemic that make even an analysis of costs incurred by hospitals during this pandemic 
unhelpful as a basis from which to extrapolate the costs to hospitals of treating victims of 
a modern pandemic.  First, many Spanish flu victims were treated in makeshift isolation 
centers.  In San Francisco, emergency hospitals were improvised wherever there were 
large, empty, and dry buildings.26 Also, because the pandemic occurred while the United 
States was in the thick of World War I, many victims were treated in military facilities.  
And on military bases, conditions were even more makeshift than they were in the 
21 See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909) (woman with leprosy sued government officials to 
avoid being isolated in a facility formerly used to house smallpox victims).
22 ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC, THE INFLUENZA OF 1918 92 (2d ed. 2003).
23 Id. at 94.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 95.
8civilian world.  At Camp Devens, Massachusetts, the base hospital was designed to hold 
1,200 men.27 In September 1918, it held in excess of 6,000, and men were in every 
corridor, spare room, and porch.28
Significant advances in medicine have rendered the type of care rendered to 
pandemic victims during the Spanish flu epidemic inadequate and unacceptable to 
today’s American public. Therefore, the costs incurred in rendering such care are would 
grossly understate medical costs in a modern analysis.  The Spanish flu swept the world 
in the days before antibiotics and antiviral drugs were available.  Because the vast 
majority of care given to Spanish flu victims was palliative, it made little difference to the 
victim’s chances of survival whether the victim was in an acute care hospital, a makeshift 
emergency hospital, a military field hospital, or at home.  There was no public 
expectation that Spanish flu victims would be treated in a hospital intensive care unit, or 
that life-support equipment, or any of the other technologically advanced (and expensive)
life-sustaining advances we have come to associate with a modern hospital, would be 
available to the pandemic victims.29
Another reason why using the economic effect of the Spanish flu on health care 
providers to estimate the economic consequences of a similar outbreak on hospitals today 
is not useful is because of the radical changes in financing of our hospitals since 1918. In 
1918 hospitals were financed mostly by charitable donations, public funds, and a steadily
27 BARRY, supra note 11, at 189.
28 Id.
29
 Scientists now believe that one reason the Spanish flu was so deadly, particularly to young, otherwise 
healthy adults, was because it caused a phenomenon called Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS).  
ARDS is a process of disintegration in the lungs.  Even today, the only care available for an ARDS victim 
is to keep her alive until her lung tissue regenerates, and she can recover.  BARRY, supra note 11, at 250.  
This requires respirators, skilled nursing, and all of the other technology available in a modern intensive 
care unit. Id. If the Spanish flu struck today, it simply would not be possible to properly treat severely 
affected pandemic victims in warehouses, schools, and other public buildings.  
9increasing, but still relatively small, proportion of privately insured patients.30 Placing 
pandemic victims in hospitals did not disrupt the hospital’s financial operations the way 
that it would today.
Today, the American health care delivery system is financed by a hodge-podge of 
public and private sources.31  In 2001, 34.8% of personal health care costs were covered 
by private health insurance, 45.4% of personal health care costs were paid by the federal 
and state governments, and 14.4% of personal health care costs were paid out-of-pocket 
by patients.32 As part of this system, substantially higher prices may be systematically 
paid by one payer group (usually the private health insurers) to offset lower prices paid 
by another (usually the federal and state governments).33  This “cost-shift hydraulic” is 
very prominent in the hospital payment system. In 2002, private insurers paid on the 
average 122% of costs for hospital services, while the federal and state governments paid 
approximately 90% of costs for the same services.34 This cost-shifting allows hospitals to 
provide social benefits to the community, such as teaching, research, standby capacity, 
and charity care.35 A pandemic that disrupts the payer mix of a health care provider, both 
immediately and in the long-term, decreases the number of patients covered by private 
insurers and increases the number of publicly insured or self-pay patients, is likely to 
have a major impact on the viability of ongoing hospital operations and a devastating 
30 PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, 294-95 (BasicBooks 1982).
31
 John K. Iglehart, Business and Government:  Striking New Balances, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7, 8 
(January/February 2002).
32 BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 194 (5TH ed. 2004).
33
 Allen Dobson, Joan DaVanzo, and Namrata Sen, The Cost-Shift Payment ‘Hydraulic’:  Foundation, 
History, and Implications, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 22, 23 (January/February 2006).
34 Id. at 24.  The importance and extent of this cost-shifting varies over time.  For example, in the early to 
mid-1980s, the public payers covered their costs, while in the mid to late 1990’s the increase in the 
prevalence of managed care drove down the percentage of costs that private insurers paid for hospital 
services by as much as 10%.  Id. at 27.  Nevertheless, the American health care financing system seems to 
depend upon the existence of cost-shifting to ensure coverage for all.  Id. at 24.
35 Id. at 23.
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effect on the social benefits to the community that hospitals provide with the funds they 
receive through the cost-shift hydraulic.  Hospitals and American society did not have to 
face this possibility during any past pandemic episode.
In addition, looking at the direct medical costs hospitals incurred in the past for 
caring for pandemic victims, and trying to extrapolate that to the modern American 
hospital, will not truly reflect the hospital’s total costs of providing such care. Generally, 
hospitals today are not paid for their actual costs.  Most payers pay hospitals based on a 
formula used to set a rate for an entire course of treatment for a particular diagnosis 
(commonly called the Diagnosis Related Group, or DRG).36 The DRG in theory 
represents the cost to an efficient hospital of caring for an average case presenting with a 
particular principal diagnosis, as determined upon admission to the hospital.37  Hospitals 
often compete to attract the type of cases for which DRG compensation is comparatively 
generous (such as uncomplicated cases with few complicating factors within a particular 
DRG, or orthopedic, cardiac and general surgical cases for which the DRG amount is 
relatively generous) in order to offset the costs of providing services for which the DRG 
does not accurately reflect total costs of care.38 The DRG is only the starting point for 
determining the hospital’s reimbursement.39 DRG payments are adjusted to compensate 
teaching hospitals for the costs of operating an educational program, for extraordinarily 
expensive or “outlier” cases, and for the particular circumstances of the hospital (rural 
versus urban, hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients).40  If a 
36 FURROW, supra note 32, at 373-374.  Although the term “DRG” is used by the Medicare program, 
virtually all payors use a similar form of prospective payment.
37 Id.
38
 Stuart Guterman, Specialty Hospitals:  A Problem Or A Symptom, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 95,97-98 
(January/February 2006).
39 FURROW, supra note 32 at 374.
40 Id.
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hospital is unable to sustain its usual case-mix of relatively highly reimbursed DRGs and 
relatively poorly reimbursed DRGs, because it has been designated as an isolation or 
quarantine center during a pandemic, it will suffer losses even if it is ultimately 
compensated for the direct medical costs of caring for pandemic victims. The designation 
of a hospital as the isolation hospital during an infectious disease outbreak for an 
extended period of time might mean bankruptcy.41
Nevertheless, there are some historical lessons we can learn from past pandemics 
regarding the financial effects of pandemics on the nation’s hospitals. In a normal flu 
year, influenza results in 114,000 hospitalizations, and between 5 and 10 million 
outpatient visits.42 If we experience an influenza pandemic, the federal government 
estimates a three to seven-fold increase in hospitalizations, and a four-fold increase in 
outpatient visits.43 The Centers for Disease Control has estimated the medical costs for 
an influenza pandemic as follows:44
41
 Mark A. Rothstein, Are Traditional Public Health Strategies Consistent with Contemporary American 
Values, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 175, 179 (Summer 2004); see also, Santora, supra note 16.
42 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DRAFT PANDEMIC INFLUENZA 
PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PLAN, p. 15 (August 2004), http://www/hhs/gov/pandemicflu/draftplan/
43 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, p. 18 
(November 2005), http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/.
44
 Martin I. Meltzer, Nancy J. Cox, and Keiji Fukuda, The Economic Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the 
United States:  Priorities for Intervention, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 659, 666 
(September/October 1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no5/meltzer.htm.
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Fig. 1 - Costs (direct and indirect)45 of influenza pandemic per gross attack rate:a deaths, 
hospitalizations, outpatients, illnesses, and total costs (in 1995 US$)
Cost per gross attack rate ($ millions)
15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Deaths
 Mean  59,288  79,051  98,814 118,577 138,340
 5th percentile  23,800  31,733  39,666  47,599 55,532
 95th percentile  94,907 126,543 158,179 189,815 221,451
Hospitalizations
 Mean  1,928  2,571  3,214  3,856
 4,499
 5th percentile  1,250  1,667  2,084  2,501  2,917
 95th percentile  2,683  3,579  4,472  5,367  6,261
Outpatients
 Mean  5,708  7,611  9,513 11,416  13,318
 5th percentile  4,871  6,495  8,119  9,742  11,366
 95th percentile  6,557  8,742  10,928 13,113  15,299
Ill, no medical care soughtb
 Mean  4,422  5,896  7,370  8,844  10,317
 5th percentile  3,270  4,360  5,450  6,540  7,629
 95th percentile  5,557  7,409  9,262 11,114  12,967
Grand totals
 Mean  71,346  95,128 118,910 142,692 166,474
 5th percentile  35,405  47,206  59,008  70,810  82,611
 95th percentile 106,988 142,650 178,313 213,975 249,638
45
 Direct medical costs, such as those reimbursed by third-party payers are the costs associated with 
hospitalizations, outpatient visits, and drug purchases.  These costs were obtained from a proprietary 
database containing health insurance claims data from approximately 4 million insured persons.  The 
researchers extracted the data for outpatient visits from the database with codes from the International 
Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) for pneumonia and bronchitis (ICD-9: 480-487.8), acute 
bronchitis (ICD-9: 466-466.1), and chronic respiratory disease (ICD-9: 490-496). Costs for inpatient care 
were extracted with the same codes, when recorded as the principal diagnosis and when recorded as any of 
the diagnoses in a patient's chart. Further, because influenza can cause patients with preexisting medical 
conditions to seek inpatient care, data were extracted for the inpatient costs of treating heart-related 
conditions (common preexisting conditions that place a person at high risk for influenza-related illness or 
death). Hospital costs attributed to pneumonia and bronchitis, acute bronchitis, chronic respiratory disease, 
and the identified heart conditions were then estimated as weighted averages. The principal indirect cost 
was lost productivity, which was valued by using an age- and gender-weighted average wage. The 
economic cost of a death was valued at the present net value of the average expected future lifetime 
earnings, weighted for gender and age.  All costs were standardized to 1995 US$ values. Id.
13
aGross attack rate = percentage of clinical influenza illness per population.
bPersons who become clinically ill due to influenza but do not seek medical care; illness has an economic impact (e.g., half day off work).
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The mean total medical costs of an influenza pandemic with a gross attack rate of 
25%, which is similar to the gross attack rate of the Spanish flu pandemic, are predicted 
to exceed $118 billion.  The bulk of those costs are attributable to the costs incurred in 
caring for victims who ultimately die, who will consume an intensive amount of hospital 
services and staff time. Much of this cost takes the form of enhanced staffing and 
hospital bed capacity that will be needed to handle a pandemic.46 Although federal, state, 
and local government have provided enhanced funding for emergency preparedness since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including funds to develop hospital surge 
capacity for outbreaks of infectious disease,47 the question of who will pay for the actual 
care of each individual pandemic victim remains fraught with uncertainty. Although 
presumably the public and private insurers of persons who are actually ill should pay for 
their treatment, if the insurer does not have a preexisting contractual relationship with the 
isolation center, and the pandemic victim is at that particular institution because of the 
orders of public health authorities, the insurer may balk at paying for the hospital stay.  
Likewise, the government, knowing that a patient is privately insured, is likely to insist 
that the private insurer pay for the patient’s care. This inevitable debate between 
insurers, the government, and the hospital about payment rates will be a significant 
distraction at a time when healthcare resources should be directed to dealing with the 
public health emergency.  Many hospitals will be tempted to avoid this outcome by doing 
46 Id. 
47
 Press Release, United States Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Announces $1.3 Billion in 
Funding to States for Bioterrorism Preparedness (May 13, 2005), available at
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050513.html (last visited March 10, 2006).
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everything in their power to avoid being designated as an isolation center, even if they are 
the most suitable places to treat pandemic victims.
Hospitals may also be used as quarantine centers for healthy individuals, such as 
health care workers who were exposed to the disease but are not sick themselves.48  Both 
our private and public funding mechanisms for health care delivery are driven by the 
concept of payment for specific diagnoses of illnesses.49  Typically, payers make no 
payment for custodial care of people who are not ill.  A hospital that is designated as a 
quarantine center is likely to be at even greater financial risk than a hospital functioning 
as an isolation center, and thus, is extremely likely to resist the designation.  Failure to 
quarantine people who have come into contact with pandemic victims at the place where 
they first come into contact with them, very possibly a hospital, as was the case during 
the SARS outbreak, will lead to increased spread of the pandemic disease in the general 
population.50 Even when feelings of civic duty and patriotism are running high, hospitals 
will be reluctant to endanger their financial health and their medical staff by complying 
with such orders.  For example, after 9/11 and the episode of anthrax bioterrorism that 
closely followed, response to the Centers for Disease Control’s request that hospitals 
prepare themselves to accept patients in the event of an emergency quarantine was 
sluggish, at best. 51
B. Hospital Resources Will Be Needed To Provide Financial Incentives for 
Medical Personnel
48 See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 13 at 24.
49See text accompanying note 36, supra.
50 See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN, 
supra note 43 at 8 (discussing the likelihood that HHS will implement quarantine as a means of slowing the 
spread of a pandemic influenza).
51 See Gretchen Reynolds, Why Were Doctors Afraid to Treat Rebecca McLester, THE NEW YORK TIMES
MAGAZINE, April 18, 2004 at 32.
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Along with the anticipated increase in hospital inpatient and outpatient visits in 
the event of a pandemic, there will be an increase in the need for medical personnel to 
care for the sick.  Despite the need, history tells us that many health care workers, from 
physicians to orderlies, will refuse to treat patients with new and emerging infectious 
diseases.52 At the very least, a substantial increase in pay will be required to recruit and 
retain sufficient health care workers during a pandemic.
For example, the existing supply of health care workers was no match for the 
numbers of patients with Spanish Flu in 1918.  Many health care workers came down 
with the flu themselves, further exacerbating the shortage of medical personnel available 
to care for the sick.53  The American Red Cross and the United States Public Health 
Service were inundated with wires begging for help.54  Unable to meet the demand, 
despite heroic efforts to track down any and all available health care workers,55 they 
called upon civic-minded housewives, retired nurses and doctors, medical and dental 
students, and all able-bodied citizens who were not in the military to tend to the 
thousands of sick patients in the emergency hospitals, and to provide supplies and 
essential services, such as sanitation, that were disrupted because of the large amount of 
workers out with the flu.56  Although many people responded to the call for help, the 
number of volunteers was not sufficient to meet the need.57  In San Francisco, during the 
height of its Spanish Flu epidemic, the Red Cross offered practical nurses $20 per week if 
52
 Rothstein, supra note 41 at 186.
53 See CROSBY, supra note 22 at 80-81.
54 BARRY, supra note 2 at 351.
55
 Barry relates one episode of a nurse named Josey Brown watching a movie in a St. Louis theater.  During 
the movie, the lights went on, the screen went blank, and a man announced that anyone named Josey 
Brown should go to the ticket booth. Id.
56 CROSBY, supra note 22, at 81, 96-97.
57 Id. at 82-83.
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they would report for work, but still could not fill the needs of the city.58  Most other 
American cities experienced similar shortages.  Some nurses were forcibly held in 
patients’ homes to care for the sick.59
During the more recent SARS outbreak, because so many doctors and nurses were 
resigning rather than be forced to treat patients with SARS, hospitals in Taiwan were 
forced to offer “danger pay” to those working with SARS patients.60  In Vietnam, 
personnel treating SARS patients received a government allowance of five times the 
amount normally given to health care workers.61  These stipends were paid initially by 
each medical institution treating SARS patients, and were ultimately reimbursed to the 
hospital by the government.62
Even substantial financial incentives may be insufficient to recruit and retain 
needed medical personnel.  During the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, 160 health care 
workers resigned rather than work with SARS patients.63  In Toronto, Lucy Smith, a 
nurse with 17 years’ experience, refused to work with SARS patients despite an order 
from the hospital where she worked to do so, and an offer of increased pay.64  When 
discussing her reasons for refusing to work with SARS patients, Ms. Smith cited the fact 
that she had three children and an immunocompromised mother, and cited her 
responsibility to them as well as her responsibility to her patients.65  As Dr. Peter Singer, 
58 Id. at 97.
59
 Rothstein, supra note 41, at 191.
60 ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 13, at 103.
61 Id. at 114.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 103.
64
 Barbara Sibbald, Right to refuse work becomes another SARS issue, 169(2) CANADIAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION JOURNAL (July 23, 2003), at 141
65 Id.  Ms. Smith’s concerns for her and her family’s safety were well-founded.  SARS was transmitted 
largely through hospital-based exposures, and health care workers were disproportionately affected.  Forty 
percent of Toronto’s SARS patients were health-care workers.  Nineteen percent of China’s SARS cases 
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director of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics explained in response to 
questions regarding Ms. Smith’s position, there is a “threshold beyond which health care 
workers aren’t obliged to take personal risks.  We don’t expect firefighters to jump into a 
burning pit, or police officers to throw themselves in front of a bullet.”66
There is no reason to believe that Americans will behave more selflessly than 
their Canadian, Vietnamese, or Taiwanese counterparts when faced with an infectious 
disease outbreak.  In fact, there is reason to believe that they will behave even more self-
protectively. Many of the Asian countries that experienced SARS outbreaks are known 
for their communitarian cultures.67  Canada is known for a commitment to social 
solidarity, especially in the area of health care and its health care system.68 Their cultures 
contrast sharply with American culture, which has a strong tradition of individualism and 
skepticism about government.69
The American tradition of individualism and minimal government intervention 
with personal liberty has been evident during public health emergencies in the past.  
During the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918, although many health care workers did their 
jobs and died doing so, many people fled even from their own loved ones who came 
down with the flu.70 The sheer inability of hospitals to deal with a sudden surge in 
patient demand was compounded by the failure of trained medical personnel to show up 
involved health-care workers, as were 57% of Vietnam’s.  Rothstein, supra note 41, at 184.  In Hong Kong, 
22% of SARS deaths were among physicians and nurses.  Rothstein, supra note 41, at 184.
66
 Sibbald, supra note 64. Although the heroic actions of firefighters and police responding to the 9/11 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York belie this statement, first-responder reaction to a highly 
visible, spectacular terrorist attack is likely to be far more heroic than the medical community’s reaction to 
a comparatively slower-moving, much more invidious emergency like a naturally occurring infectious 
disease pandemic.
67 ROTHSTEIN, ET AL. supra note 13, at 26 (November 2003).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 BARRY, supra note 2, at 342-3.
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for work, not only because they themselves were ill, but because of fear of contact with 
the sick.71  Towns that were not hit during the Spanish flu pandemic’s first wave, and had 
notice of the coming pandemic and thus had time to prepare, enforced complete isolation 
from their surroundings at gunpoint.72  Although this method of enforced quarantine was 
apparently effective,73 it does not evidence a willingness for self-sacrifice on the part of 
Americans in the face of epidemic disease.
Nor has the attitude of American health care workers towards self-sacrifice in the 
face of epidemic disease appear to have improved since 1918.  In the 1980’s, when it 
became known that H.I.V. could be transmitted through bodily fluids, doctors and other 
health care providers turned away AIDS patients.74  In June 2003, a physician in 
Rockford, Illinois who volunteered to treat a girl with monkeypox75 incurred the wrath of 
his physician partners, who felt that his contact with the girl would put them all at risk.76
Fears of bioterrorism can also fuel health care workers’ reluctance to treat.  One
physician with small children who treated a monkeypox patient explained that prior to a 
definitive diagnosis, he feared a bioterror attack of smallpox:  “My attitude was, I’m 
going to stay as far away from this guy as possible.”77 The physician’s experience with 
monkeypox has convinced him that he would not volunteer for anything dangerous in the 
future, and that he would not be “turned into” a first responder in a public health 
71
 Santora, supra note 16.
72 BARRY, supra note 2, at 345.
73
 Gunnison, Colorado, which enforced a total isolation of the town by closing it and banning public 
gatherings, escaped without a single death, while the nearby town of Sargents suffered six deaths in a single 
day, out of a total population of 130.  Id. at 345-46.
74 See Reynolds, supra note 51; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1988) (dentist refused to treat an 
HIV positive patient in the dentist’s office).
75
 Monkeypox is an orthopox virus similar to smallpox.  There was a monkeypox outbreak in the American 
Midwest in 2003, which was traced to Gambian giant pouched rats imported from Ghana to the United 
States as exotic pets.  The Gambian rats infected prairie dogs at area pet shops, which in turn infected at 
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emergency.78  A study from the fall of 2003 found that more than 50 percent of doctors 
would not accept a smallpox vaccination, 67 percent would not treat smallpox without 
having been vaccinated, and only 55 percent of doctors surveyed agreed that physicians 
have an obligation to care for patients even if it might endanger their own health.79
In modern society, the American tradition of individualism in health care has 
become even more entrenched than it was in the past because of structural changes in the 
way health care is delivered. The advent of managed care, greater compartmentalization 
of care, and the lack of a statement of a duty to treat in professional organizations’ 
mission statements and ethical guidelines are all cited as reasons for the erosion of a 
sense of community in American health care.80 Financial incentives to care for victims of 
an infectious disease pandemic alone will not reverse this erosion, nor ensure an ample 
supply of health care workers in an emergency.  Nevertheless, they represent one step 
towards ensuring that those who do step forward are rewarded for their courage and 
community-minded spirit, or at least, treated equitably. Nurses and other front-line 
medical personnel will look to their employers, generally the hospitals, to pay the 
financial incentives that will be required to attempt to care for isolated and quarantined 
persons.  Hospitals must have resources available to make these payments.
C. The Lingering Economic Effects of a Pandemic on Hospitals.
Even if provisions are made to compensate hospitals used as isolation centers 
during a pandemic, or as quarantine centers for healthy individuals, any means of
78 Id.  
79Dr. Matthew Wynia & Dr. Caleb Alexander, Ready and Willing?  Physicians’ Sense of Preparedness for 
Bioterrorism; Only 21 Percent feel prepared, but 80 percent are willing, HEALTH AFFAIRS
(September/Oct. 2003), available at LEXIS, Health Care Library, Health Care Journals .  Again, this 
attitude amongst health care providers distinguishes them from persons who we traditionally consider first 
responders, such as firefighters and police officers, who exhibited their willingness to risk their own lives 
during a public emergency after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.
80
 Rothstein, supra note 41, at 186.
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alleviating the economic burden of a pandemic on the nation’s hospitals and ensuring 
compliance with the orders of public health officials must account for the economic after-
effects of the hospital’s designation as a “pesthouse.”  American history is rife with 
examples of the subsequent undesirability and perceived unmarketability of places used 
to quarantine and/or isolate persons with infectious diseases such as smallpox or 
leprosy.81 During the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, property owners who protested the 
taking of their property by local public health officials for quarantine or isolation centers, 
fearing the lingering stigma of having been the “pesthouse” would hurt their business 
after the epidemic ended, found no sympathy from local health officers.  For example, in 
response to a complaint filed by a hotel owner protesting the commandeering of his 
property for an emergency flu hospital, a health official in Spokane, Washington 
reportedly said:  “We don’t care a rap what the owners of the building think about it or 
about us. . . . This is a very serious emergency and if the owners of the Lion Hotel think 
they can put a dollar on one side of the scale and a human life on the other and get away 
with it, they are very, very badly mistaken.”82
81 See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909) (describing a house formerly used to isolate persons 
with smallpox as a “pesthouse,” and describing the efforts of an elderly citizen of the city with leprosy to 
avoid being sent to live there); J.A. Brown v. County of Pierce, 68 P. 872 ( Wash. 1902) (claiming a right 
to compensation from the city of Tacoma for the full value of property used by the city as a “pesthouse” for 
the isolation and quarantine of persons with smallpox because by such use the marketable value of the 
property was destroyed).
82
 Heather Lalley, Flu Outbreak of 1918 Proved Devastating to Spokane, World, SPOKANE SPOKESMAN-
REVIEW, November 18, 2004, at D8.  Of course, we live in a different world today.  Through the 
ascendancy of private health insurance as the primary method of payment for hospital care in the years 
since 1918, the efforts to control rising health care costs since the 1970’s, and the most recent appearance 
of consumer-driven health care spending, Americans are used to a health care system that weighs expenses 
against human life.  The recent debate in California and other states about mandating nurse staffing ratios 
in hospitals is a good example of the prevalence of weighing cost against life in our health care delivery 
system.  A recent study shows that trimming a nurse’s workload by a single patient can save lives, but costs 
between $24,000 and $136,000.  Michael B. Rothberg, Ivo Abraham, Peter K. Lindenauer, and David N. 
Rose, Improving Nurse-to-Patient Staffing Ratios as a Cost-Effective Safety Intervention, 43 MEDICAL 
CARE 8 (August 2005).  Hospitals and legislators are using the study to debate the wisdom of mandating a 
nurse-to-patient ratio in Massachusetts.  Melanie Evans, Putting a price on care, MODERN HEALTHCARE, 
August 8, 2005, at 14.
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Hospitals are not immune from the stigma of being designated the “pesthouse.”
Scarborough Hospital in Toronto, Canada was the first hospital in Toronto to isolate 
SARS patients.83 Scarborough’s first SARS patient experienced a long wait in the 
hospital emergency department (18-20 hours) before SARS was suspected.84  Therefore, 
persons who entered the hospital after the first patient, but before adequate infection 
control measures had been implemented, were asked to adhere to a 10-day home 
quarantine.85 Subsequently, four hospitals were designated as SARS facilities in the 
city.86 Despite the cessation of the SARS outbreak by the summer of 2003, Scarborough 
Hospital continued to experience a loss in patients and severe stigma as a “pesthouse” 
long after the outbreak ended.87
If a similar patient boycott occurred in an American hospital, the loss of lucrative 
privately insured patients, who, under the cost-shifting that is ubiquitous in our financing 
system for hospitals, subsidize other patients and socially beneficial hospital services, 
would seriously challenge a hospital’s financial viability. The affected hospitals would 
be left caring for only patients who had no choice of providers—generally, the publicly 
funded patients whose care is paid by the government at less than cost, or uninsured 
patients who cannot pay at all.  This would exacerbate the precarious financial position 
the hospital would experience after a public health emergency.
Privately owned hospitals will be particularly sensitive to social stigma. Not-for-
profit privately owned hospitals rely on their ability to issue and sell bonds to the public 
83 ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 13, at 55.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 24.
86 Id. at 56.
87
 David Baird, Esq., Tory’s LLP, Remarks at Breaking Down the Divide:  Contemporary Corporate 
Theory Applied to the Health Care Industry, Seattle University School of Law (February 27, 2004).
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to finance their capital needs, and for-profit privately owned hospitals are dependent 
upon the capital markets for their needs. If the public fears going to a particular hospital 
because of its prior designation as an isolation or quarantine facility, the hospital will 
have great difficulty attracting investment in either the bond or stock markets. The 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina on the privately owned hospitals in the New Orleans area 
illustrates the effect that a major disruption in the hospital’s normal business activities
due to a natural disaster can have on the hospital’s ability to resume its normal activities 
when the disruption ceases.  In New Orleans, even hospitals that were not physically 
damaged by the hurricane have remained closed since the disaster, due to lack of funds to 
reopen.88  Whether they reopen or not is entirely dependent on the capital markets.89
Therefore, ensuring hospital compliance with the orders of public health officials 
during an infectious disease pandemic will require assuring providers that they will be 
protected from the direct and indirect costs of caring for pandemic victims, from the loss 
of the ability to cost-shift during the pandemic, and from probable loss of business and 
the ability to cost-shift after the pandemic is over.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING LAW TO PROTECT OUR
HOSPITALS FROM THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A 
PANDEMIC
A financially sound hospital system before, during, and after a public health 
emergency is critical to the public’s health and the economic and social recovery of a 
region.90 The law is our primary mechanism for ensuring that our hospital system remains 
88 See Reed Abelson, Can Hospitals Reopen?  It’s a Matter of Money, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 14, 
2005, at C1-C5.
89 Id.
90 Id.
24
sound after a pandemic.91  Nevertheless, although public health systems and hospitals are 
heavily regulated at the federal, state, and local government levels, current law does not
ensure the financial health and continued viability of the nation’s hospitals during and 
after an infectious disease pandemic.  Although government officials and the private 
sector have been paying increased attention to legal preparedness for a public health 
emergency in recent years, these efforts fail to address the economic hardships that 
hospitals will face during and after a pandemic.  Therefore, they will fail to achieve their 
essential purpose of ensuring that the hospitals and other first-responders are ready and 
available to respond to a pandemic, and are ready and available to resume their vital 
function in our health care delivery system after the pandemic subsides.  The following 
sections discuss existing federal and state laws that are commonly cited as economic 
protectors for the nation’s hospitals, and points out their failure to deal with the realities 
of hospital finance.
A. The Takings Clause
On the federal level, there are a number of constitutional provisions,92 statutes, 
regulations, and administrative pronouncements that address the economic interests of 
health care providers responding to a public health emergency, such as an infectious 
91 See generally, LAWRENCE GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:  POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 4 (University of 
California Press 2000); Barry S. Levy, M.D., Twenty-First Century Challenges for Law and Public Health, 
32 IND. L. REV. 1149 (1999).
92
 In addition to the Takings Clause, discussed infra, at various times in our history the courts have 
interpreted the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause to protect private economic interests from 
encroachment by state or federal government.  See U.S. CONST. art. I §10 (Contracts Clause); U.S. CONST. 
amend XIV §1 (Due Process Clause); EUGENE CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 222-224, 559 (2d ed. 
2005).  Nevertheless, the Contracts Clause cannot be used to override the power of the state to regulate as 
necessary to ensure the health, safety, and general welfare of the community.  See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line 
R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).  And the use of the Due Process clause to protect private 
contractual relationships from government interference has given way to extreme deference to the 
legislature’s determination that there is a rational basis for a law that allegedly interferes with the economic 
liberty of private persons.  See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  Therefore these 
constitutional provisions are likely to be of little use to hospitals seeking compensation from the 
government for damages caused by compliance with orders of isolation and quarantine during a pandemic.
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disease pandemic.  Nevertheless, they are inadequate to assure complete compensation 
for health care providers whose economic interests are adversely affected by compliance 
with the orders of public health officials during an outbreak of pandemic disease.  They 
fail to provide incentives to hospitals and their medical staffs to put their duties as first 
responders during a pandemic above their interests in preserving the economic status quo 
on which they depend for survival.
Although legal scholars differ about whether protection of wealth and property 
was the primary motivating force behind the United States Constitution, there is no doubt 
that economic and private property rights were among those the framers sought to 
protect.93 The Takings Clause decrees that private property may not be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.94 When a hospital receives an order from a public health 
official adversely affecting its economic interests, such as an order for isolating sick 
patients or quarantining exposed persons, it is likely that the facility will call upon the 
courts to decide whether a compensable taking has occurred.  Such a case is likely to 
raise a host of vexing questions about what types of government actions constitute 
compensable takings.  Clearly government action taken to combat an outbreak of 
infectious disease is designed to defeat a “public enemy,” thus presenting a compelling 
argument that the action constitutes a taking for public use.95  Nevertheless, according to 
the United States Supreme Court, not all private sacrifice s needed to defeat a “public 
93 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519-20 (2d ed. 2005)
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 U.S. CONST. Amend. V.  The Takings Clause has been deemed to apply to state governments and 
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R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).  Furthermore, all state constitutions either expressly or impliedly 
prohibit takings without just compensation.  Stephen Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics:  Should 
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95 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928); In re Property Located at 14255 53rd Ave. S. v. Department 
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enemy” require just compensation under the Takings Clause.96  Rather, the Court has 
long held that determining whether a compensable taking has occurred depends on the 
type of government action taken, the relative strength of the interests of the public versus 
the interests of the affected property owner, the extent of the property owner’s economic 
loss, and the reasonable expectations of the property owner.97
 Virtually all of these questions are terra incognita in the context of how they 
would apply to hospitals’ requests for compensation for economic losses incurred due to
an infectious disease pandemic. Modern-day Takings Clause jurisprudence has 
developed simultaneously with great advances in the fields of medicine and public 
health.98  Because of these medical advances, large-scale epidemics requiring isolation 
and quarantine of sick persons in modern hospitals are virtually unknown in the United 
States. At the same time that advances in medicine and technology made the need for 
large-scale isolation and quarantine of persons exposed to infectious disease virtually 
obsolete, the Court was interpreting the Takings Clause to require just compensation for 
government regulatory actions, both permanent and temporary, that had previously  been 
considered non-compensable.99  Therefore, 19th-century and early-20th century Takings 
Clause jurisprudence, the jurisprudence that existed the last time the United States had to 
contemplate the consequences of large-scale isolation and quarantine of infectious 
disease victims, has limited utility in the context of analyzing what the courts would do 
96 Id.
97 See Miller, 276 U.S. at 279; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
98For example, advances in public health have accounted for about twenty-five of the thirty years of 
increased life expectancy in the United States since the beginning of the 20th century.  LEVY, supra  note 
91, at 1150.
99 See, e.g. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (establishing that government regulation 
of private property  may be considered a constitutional “taking,” requiring just compensation, even if the 
government does not physically possess the property).
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today if faced with hospital claims for compensation based on their compliance with 
isolation and quarantine orders.  The courts have rarely, if ever, had an opportunity to 
apply the Takings Clause to orders of public health officials closing hospitals or 
designating them as isolation or quarantine centers.  
Courts decide Takings Clause cases as questions of law, based on the factual 
background of each specific case.100 By its own terms, the Takings Clause only applies 
when “property” is taken for “public use.”  The Court has defined public use broadly, and 
has specifically held that government designation of a hospital as an isolation or 
quarantine facility is a legitimate exercise of the state’s police powers to protect the 
public health.101
Although an order establishing an isolation or quarantine center on private 
property is undoubtedly a “public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause, it is 
less certain whether such an order involves a taking of “property.” Physical occupation 
of the hospital by the government would clearly involve interference with “property,” 
since even a de minimus physical occupation of real property has been held to constitute a 
compensable taking.102  An order establishing an isolation or quarantine center at a 
hospital could involve a physical occupation of the hospital by the government, but it is 
far more likely to constitute a regulatory action directing the hospital to use its premises 
in a certain manner, thus disrupting the day-to-day business of the hospital.  It is far from 
clear whether the hospital’s contracts with insurers and other business associates, and 
100
 Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 440, 444 (2005).
101
 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).  The “public use” requirement is satisfied when the 
government’s exercise of its eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.  
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984).  The Court has defined “public 
purpose” broadly, to be coterminous with the sovereign’s exercise of its police powers.  Id. at 240.  
102 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that 
installation of cables on an apartment building was a physical occupation requiring just compensation).
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day-to-day revenue-producing operations are “property” within the meaning of the 
Takings Clause. Protecting these intangible interests would be of paramount importance 
to a hospital when considering whether to comply with an order designating it an 
isolation or quarantine center.  The United States Supreme Court has found compensable 
takings when government action adversely affects intangible interests such as loss of 
repose,103 intellectual property,104 and monetary interest on pooled funds.105 Yet a 
hospital would have no certainty as to whether the Takings Clause would protect its 
intangible business interests.  Intangible business-related interests have been 
characterized as compensable “property” in some types of takings, but have been 
characterized as non-compensable losses in others.106
Most commentators and court decisions distinguish between two types of takings
of property:  possessory and regulatory.107 A possessory taking occurs when the 
government confiscates or physically occupies private property.108 A permanent physical 
occupation of property, no matter how minor, is a compensable taking no matter how 
strong the public interest that the government’s action serves.109  If the government 
permanently physically occupied a hospital and ran it as an isolation or quarantine 
103
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106See David B. Sweet, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Views As to What Constitutes “Private Property” 
Within Meaning of Prohibition, Under Federal Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, Against Taking of Private
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NOWAK AND RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2004).  
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facility, clearly the former owners of the hospital would be entitled to compensation.110
The only question remaining (and it is a big one) would be the proper measure of 
damages.
In the relatively straightforward situation of a permanent physical occupation of 
property by the government, there is a formula for compensating the former owner of the 
property.  The value compensable in the case of a permanent physical occupation of 
property by the government is the value which is capable of transfer from owner to 
owner, i.e., the fair market value of the property at the time of the government’s action, 
from the perspective of the owner.111 Nevertheless, the loss to the owner of 
nontransferable value deriving from a unique need for the property, or a sentimental or 
illogical attachment to it, is treated as a loss for the common good, and is not 
compensable.112 Sentimental value or inordinate attachment to a piece of property is not 
something that is transferable to the government. Likewise, eminent domain law 
generally does not recognize a right to compensation for destruction of business 
goodwill, provided the former owner is free to pick up and continue her business 
elsewhere.113 The government must only pay for what it gets, not for what the owner 
loses.114  In the normal possessory taking, business goodwill and going-concern value are 
not considered compensable “property.”  The government does not receive these 
110
 For an example of statutory authority for a public health authority to commandeer and operate a hospital 
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interests, because it does not continue to operate the property seized as a business.  These
types of losses are treated as the price of citizenship, and as a sacrifice to the greater good 
of the community.115
Thus, if the government seizes a hospital, and subsequently shuts it down, 
compensation based on the fair market value of the property seized (i.e., the land, 
equipment, and fixtures) might be considered constitutionally adequate.  After all, the 
former hospital owners would not receive back from the government a hospital with a 
significantly diminished value some time in the future, which they will have to rebuild 
into a viable business enterprise.  They would not have to entice paying patients back to 
the hospital after it ceases being an isolation or quarantine center.  They would not need 
to assure potential patients or insurers that a feared infectious disease was completely 
gone from the hospital, or that the hospital was once again capable of delivering the same 
type of quality care they had come to expect from it before it was appropriated by the 
government. If the hospital owners wished to engage in the business of operating a 
general acute care hospital again, they could take the fair market value payment they 
received from the government for the hospital’s tangible assets, find a new location, and 
start over, pointing to their record as owners of a successful acute care hospital prior to 
the government’s actions as support for their new business.116  No lingering stigma of a 
hospital having been designated as the “pesthouse” will follow them to their new 
business venture. Theoretically, hospital owners can re-establish their relationships with 
115
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insurers, suppliers, and employees on the same or similar terms to those they had 
previously negotiated, with no ill effects.  
Although the government has the legal authority to physically occupy a hospital 
and run it as an isolation or quarantine facility, even if it did so, it is highly unlikely that 
such an occupation would be permanent.  When the immediate public health crisis 
subsides, and the government no longer needs the hospital, it will most likely return the 
hospital to the owners.  The owners of a business that has been temporarily occupied by 
the government and run as a going concern, and then returned to the owners after the 
government’s need for the business ends, are in a much different position than the owners 
of a business that is permanently appropriated by the government.  Unlike business 
owners whose business is gone forever, it is not financially feasible for business owners 
who know that they will get their business back at some point in the future to open a new 
version of their old business while the government is occupying their old business.  If 
they do, they are likely to find themselves with two identical businesses at some point, 
neither of which can be operated at a profit because of the existence of the other 
business.117 This temporary interruption of the owner’s business narrows the range of 
alternatives open to the owner so much, that it increases the government’s obligation to 
him.118  Although the usual measure of damages for a temporary possessory taking is the 
fair rental value of the property for the time period it is used by the government,119 when 
the government’s actions have so narrowed the range of alternatives available to the 
property owner, the government may be required to pay for the loss of going-concern 
117
 Kimball Laundry Co., 338 U.S. at 14.
118 Id. at 15.
119 See J.E. Keefe, Jr., Elements and Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain for Temporary Use and 
Occupancy, 7 A.L.R.2d 1297 (1949, updated April 2002). 
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value or goodwill experienced by the owner due to the government’s actions.120 In this 
situation, the government is receiving the going-concern value and goodwill of the 
business, and these interests are considered compensable property.
Although the government has the power to occupy and operate a hospital during a 
public health emergency, it is far more likely that public health authorities will rely on 
their statutory or regulatory power to designate hospitals as isolation and quarantine 
facilities, and require the hospital to comply with those orders, while the owners remain 
in possession and continue to operate the hospital.121 If this type of government action 
qualifies as a taking at all, it would constitute a regulatory taking.  There is no set formula 
for determining when government regulation has gone “too far” in encroaching on the 
rights of private property owners, and constitutes a regulatory taking.122 It is well-settled 
that if government action permanently deprives a property owner of all economically 
beneficial use of her property, the government must pay the owner just compensation.123
In such a case, business goodwill and going concern value may be compensable property, 
as they are when there is a temporary possessory taking of a going business concern, 
120
 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1949).  This principle has recently been held 
to apply to a regulatory taking that creates a government monopoly in the former business owner’s line of 
work.  See Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 440 (2005) (holding that the proper measure 
of damages to a former airline security business for the federal government’s takeover of the airline 
security industry should include payment for lost goodwill and going-concern value). 
121 See, e.g.,  MSEHPA §502(b), supra note 110.  Federal, state and local governments do not have the 
personnel necessary to physically occupy the number of hospitals that are likely to be needed in the event 
of a large-scale public health emergency.  The United States Public Health Service has only 1,300 
commissioned medical officers, 1,000 registered nurses, and 760 pharmacists nationwide.  See 
http://www.usphs.gov/html/professions/html.
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 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,  415-16 (1922)
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 Lingle, Governor of Hawaii et al. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., ____ U.S. ___, ____, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2081 
(2005), quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in 
original).
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especially if the government has made it impossible, through regulation or otherwise, for 
the former business owners to engage in their former business elsewhere.124
Nevertheless, this “per se” rule of compensation does not apply to a temporary 
regulatory taking, even if the regulation does deprive the property owner of all beneficial 
use of her property while it is in effect.125 For temporary regulatory actions, whether a 
compensable taking has occurred is an unqualified “maybe.”126 Furthermore, the Court 
has cautioned against applying precedents from possessory takings cases to regulatory 
takings cases, making analysis of temporary regulatory takings cases even more 
constricted and fact-specific.127
For the vast majority of regulatory takings cases, both permanent and temporary, 
the Court has applied a three-factor test to determine if compensation is due to the 
property owners, known as the Penn Central test.128 The primary Penn Central factors 
are:  The economic impact of the regulation on the property owner; the extent to which 
the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations; and the character of the 
governmental action.129  The inquiry is specific to the facts of each case, making it 
virtually impossible to predict in advance whether or not a particular government action 
will result in a compensable taking.
124 See Huntleigh USA, 63 Fed. Cl. 440.
125
 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (holding 
that a building moratorium lasting 32 months did not necessarily constitute a per se compensable taking).
126 Id. at 321.
127 Id. at 323.  This caution has not troubled the United States Court of Federal Claims.  The Court of 
Federal Claims recently extended the holding in Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949), a 
temporary possessory takings case requiring compensation for lost good will and going concern value, to a 
permanent regulatory taking.  Huntleigh USA, 63 Fed. Cl. 440 (2005).
128
 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323.
129 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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The law regarding the availability of compensation for goodwill and going 
concern value in the event of designation of a hospital as an isolation or quarantine 
facility during a pandemic is summarized in Figure 2:
Fig 2:  Availability of compensation for loss of goodwill and going concern 
value for designation as an isolation or quarantine center
Government Physically 
Occupies and Runs the 
Hospital
Government Issues 
Orders Designating the 
Hospital as an Isolation or 
Quarantine Center, 
Hospital Continues to Be 
Operated by Owners
Temporary Designation of 
Hospital as an Isolation or 
Quarantine Facility
Yes Maybe
Permanent Designation of 
Hospital as an Isolation or 
Quarantine Facility
No, unless the condemnor 
continues to run the 
business as a hospital and 
thus makes use of the 
hospital’s accumulated 
goodwill.
Yes, but only if owner is 
deprived of all 
economically beneficial use 
of property.
In the context of an order designating a hospital as a temporary isolation or 
quarantine center, one could imagine the myriad of fact-specific inquiries that would 
plague the courts under the Penn Central test.  For example, with regard to the economic 
impact of the regulation on the property owner, should loss to the hospital be offset by 
any payment made to the hospital by the public health authorities for caring for isolated 
or quarantined people?  What are the hospital’s true damages, given the cost-shifting 
phenomenon and the convoluted nature of hospital payments structures?  What kind of 
investment-backed expectations exist for private non-profit hospitals, and how does a 
charitable mission factor into these expectations?  With regard to the character of the 
government action, shouldn’t hospitals, which are heavily regulated by the state, expect 
35
to be subject to orders of this nature, and therefore have no vested property right in the 
ability to carry on their business during a public health emergency?130
The most likely hospital scenario is a temporary regulatory designation as an 
isolation or quarantine facility. Under current Takings Clause jurisprudence, the only 
thing that is certain in this scenario is that a hospital will have the opportunity to argue 
about whether it is entitled to receive any compensation from the government.  And even 
if it convinces a court that the Penn Central factors militate in favor of compensation, it 
must then argue that the Court’s possessory Takings Clause jurisprudence allowing 
compensation for goodwill and going-concern value in certain circumstances should 
apply to a temporary regulatory taking, an analogy that the Court has discouraged.131 And
even if it convinces the court that goodwill and going-concern value are compensable 
property in the case of a temporary regulatory taking, these are notoriously hard to 
quantify, stumping even a scholar of law and economics of the caliber of Justice Felix 
Frankfurter.132
The uncertainty of availability, type, or amount of compensation available under 
the Takings Clause prevents it from acting as an incentive for hospitals to comply with 
the orders of public health authorities during a pandemic. In the case of a wide-scale 
public health emergency requiring multiple isolation and quarantine centers capable of 
using sophisticated medical technology, the threat of massive amounts of litigation 
130 See, generally, Huntleigh, 63 Fed. Cl. 440, 446-448 (2005) (discussing the highly regulated nature of the 
airline security business and rejecting that as a reason to refrain from ordering compensation for 
government taking).
131
 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323-24.
132
 In Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949), Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion did not 
dictate a methodology for the trial court to use to value good will or going-concern value.  Id. at 16.  
Instead, it set forth various examples of how to calculate the value of these intangibles from economic texts 
of the time, and remanded the matter to the trial court to sort out.  Id.  The dissenters noted with disdain that 
the majority opinion includes an “academic dissertation on valuation.”  Id. at 23. 
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regarding the entitlement to, and amount of compensation due to hospitals will not only 
cool the eagerness of hospitals to comply with the orders of public health authorities, but 
could also temper the government’s response to the emergency, cause delay, and 
adversely affect the public’s health. The undeveloped state of o ur Takings Clause 
jurisprudence in the context of public health emergencies provides hospitals with
incentives to protect themselves by resisting such orders in the first place, rather than 
taking the chance of complying and engaging in protracted and risky litigation about the 
amount of compensation due afterwards.
A less apparent danger to the viability and quality of our health care system from 
the uncertain state of our Takings Clause jurisprudence in this area is what some scholars 
have called “demoralization costs.”133  This is the likelihood that a property owner, 
knowing that the compensation she receives will be inadequate if her property is taken, 
will fail to maintain the property or use it properly.134 A hospital that knows that that it is 
unlikely to receive adequate compensation for its losses if it is designated as an isolation 
or quarantine facility, has little economic incentive to build additional capacity or invest 
in additional equipment in anticipation of a pandemic, if the additional space and 
equipment are unlikely to be used when there is no pandemic.135 As hospitals realize the 
uncertainty of adequate compensation to make up for their designation as an isolation or 
quarantine center, they will be more and more likely to resist such designations in any 
way legally possible.  Hospitals may choose to make themselves less attractive targets for 
public health authorities seeking isolation or quarantine centers by channeling funds 
133 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness:  Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)
134 Id.
135 Id.; see also, Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics:  Should “Just Compensation” Be 
Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 525 (2003).
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away from pandemic preparedness.  Instead, hospitals may shy away from the possibility 
of becoming isolation or quarantine centers, hoping instead to reap the benefits of 
receiving more lucrative business that isolation and quarantine centers will have to turn 
away. This demoralization cost is a creeping detriment to the population’s health care.
B. Federal Statutory and Regulatory Authorities
A small number of diseases are subject to federal quarantine authority.136
Expenses for the care and treatment of persons quarantined pursuant to federal quarantine 
authority may be paid for by the United States Public Health Service.137  For all other 
diseases, state and local governments have primary responsibility for isolation and 
quarantine within their borders.138 Federal authorities do not apply until the Director of 
the Centers for Disease Control determines that measures taken by state or local 
authorities are inadequate to prevent the spread of a communicable disease outside of a 
state.139
This does not mean that there will be no federal assistance available to assist 
hospitals in the event of an infectious disease pandemic.  Federal statutes such as the 
Stafford Act140 and the Public Health Service Act141 specify certain conditions under 
136
 Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17255 (April 4, 2003), and Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 
17299 (April 1, 2005).  These diseases are cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, 
yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers (Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Crimean-Congo, South American, and 
others not yet isolated or named), SARS, and influenza caused by novel or reemergent influenza viruses 
that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic.  Id.
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 42 U.S.C.S. §249 (1994). The legislation does not specify a payment amount or rate.  Furthermore, 
although persons not otherwise entitled to treatment by the Public Health Service may be treated in cases of 
emergency, they will be charged for treatment.  42 C.F.R. §32.111 (2005).  This will leave the hospital 
holding the bag with regard to payment for any treatment they render under orders of the Public Health 
Service that is not for one of the federally quarantinable diseases.
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 Centers for Disease Control, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Legal Authorities for 
Isolation and Quarantine at 1 (page last modified January 27, 2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/legal.htm (last visited March 13, 2006).
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 42 U.S.C.S §5121 et seq. (2002)
141
 42 U.S.C.S §241 et seq. (1994)
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which the federal government will contribute resources, personnel, and financial aid in 
the event of a public health emergency.  Nevertheless, these statutes provide no assurance 
that federal financial resources will be either adequate to meet the hospitals’ short-term 
needs, nor are they directed towards alleviating the long-term financial effects of a 
pandemic on hospitals.  Rather, the vast majority of federal expenditures authorized 
under these statutes are allocated to state and local governments to prepare and plan for 
immediate needs during a public health emergency, such as enhanced communications
between first responders, and pre-emergency development of hospital surge capacity.142
Virtually no funds have been earmarked for alleviating the long-term financial effects of 
a public health emergency on the nation’s health care delivery system. Although 
spending funds to develop better disease surveillance systems and hospital surge capacity 
is laudable and certainly necessary, it does not provide an economic incentive for 
hospitals and other first responders to cooperate with the orders of public health 
authorities during the critical early stages of an emergency. 
1. The Stafford Act
The Stafford Act is the federal government’s primary legislation designed to 
alleviate the consequences of major disasters and emergencies in the United States.143  An 
infectious disease pandemic falls within the Stafford Act’s definition of an 
“emergency.”144  The President can declare that an emergency exists only upon the 
request of the Governor of an affected state.145  The Governor must base her request on a 
142 See, e.g., News Release, United States Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Announces 
$1.3 Billion in Funding to States for Bioterrorism Preparedness (May 13, 2005), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2005pres/20050513.html (on file with the author).
143
 42 U.S.C.S. §5122 et seq. (2002).
144
 42 U.S.C.S. §5122(1) (2002). 
145
 42 U.S.C.S. § 5170 (2002)
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finding that the “situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is 
beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal 
Assistance is necessary.”146
In the context of an infectious disease pandemic, the requirement that a public 
official admit that the situation is beyond the capabilities of the local governments is a 
serious disincentive to declaring an emergency. There is a serious stigma and 
accompanying loss of revenue that surrounds a geographic area, industry, or even 
building that becomes associated in the public’s mind with an infectious disease. For 
example, during the outbreak of an influenza virus in 1976 at Fort Dix, New Jersey, that 
became known as the “swine flu” because the type of influenza virus involved was 
normally a pig virus, pig farmers complained that the name “swine flu” might frighten 
people away from eating pork.147   They suggested renaming the flu the “New Jersey 
flu.”148  New Jersey officials, concerned about the effect the name “New Jersey flu” 
would have on the state’s image, vigorously resisted this moniker.149
More recently, worldwide reaction to the SARS outbreak was delayed because of 
China’s fear that news of SARS would negatively impact local economies, particularly 
before the upcoming Chinese New Year.150 During the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, the 
Taiwanese Health Department fined three physicians the equivalent of $2,600, and three 
hospitals the equivalent of $43,000 each for covering up or delaying the reporting of 
possible SARS cases.151 The City of Toronto and the Province of Ontario are currently 
146 Id.
147 KOLATA, supra note 3 ,at 155
148 Id.
149 Id.
150
 David Bishop, Note, Lessons from SARS:  Why the WHO Must Provide Greater Economic Incentives for 
Countries to Comply with International Health Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 1173, 1184 (2005).
151 ROTHSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 13, at 103.
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defending several lawsuits based on their alleged failure to take appropriate measures to 
control the outbreak of SARS, allegedly because of their desire to preserve the public 
image of Toronto and not alarm the international community.152 Therefore, federal 
assistance triggered by a declaration under the Stafford Act is likely to be delayed until 
the situation is dire enough to override the legitimate stigma concerns of local business 
interests and politicians.
Nevertheless, once the President declares a federal emergency, federal emergency 
assistance is available to the affected area to support its efforts to “save lives, protect 
property and public health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe.”153
Total assistance for a single emergency cannot exceed $5,000,000, unless the President 
determines that continued assistance is immediately required because of a continuing and 
immediate risk to lives, property, public health or safety, and that there is no other 
assistance available.154  Under the Stafford Act, the federal government is the payer of 
last resort; an applicant for aid under the Act must exhaust all other sources of aid first, 
including private insurance.155  The United States may recoup federal assistance if it 
duplicates benefits available to the person from another source.156
When an emergency declared under the Stafford Act involves public health needs 
or a developing potential medical situation, federal assistance is delivered pursuant to the 
structure set forth in the Department of Health and Human Services Emergency Support 
152 See, e.g., Reasons for Decision at 2-4, Between Andrea Williams and The Attorney-General of Canada 
et al., No. 03-CV-259366 CP, (Ontario Superior Court of Justice August 22, 2005) (on file with the author).
153
 42 U.S.C.S §5192(a) (2002).
154
 42 U.S.C.S §5193(b) (2002).
155
 42 U.S.C.S §5155 (2002).
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Function #8 (ESF 8).157  ESF 8 specifies the types of supplemental federal assistance 
available to state and local governments to meet the health and medical needs of victims 
of emergencies.158  The federal assistance authorized under ESF 8 is in the form of 
administration and coordination.159  ESF 8 specifically states that “[A]rrangements for 
definitive medical care are primarily a local function.  Requests for additional assistance 
should first be referred to State authorities.”160  ESF 8 does not provide for any federal 
involvement in the after-effects of a public health emergency, economic or otherwise, on 
the nation’s hospitals.
2. The Public Health Service Act
The Stafford Act is not the only federal legislation applicable to a public health 
emergency situation.  The Public Health Service Act161 (PHSA) specifically addresses the 
powers and role of the federal government during public health and medical 
emergencies.162 Under the PHSA, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services can declare a public health emergency, and may make grants and provide 
awards for expenses to entities involved in responding to such an emergency.163 The 
Secretary’s declaration of a public health emergency automatically expires after 90 days, 
subject to renewal.164 The PHSA establishes a “Public Health Emergency Fund” 
157
 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Health and Medical Services Annex, 
Emergency Support Function #8 (January 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml (last visited March 13, 2006)
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160 Id. at 14.
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available to the Secretary in the event she declares a public health emergency.165
Although the fund was previously required to have a balance of $30 million at the 
beginning of each fiscal year, current legislation does not establish any specific funding 
level for the fund.166 Expenditures from the fund are designed to meet short-term public 
health emergency needs; they can only be made while a declaration of a public health 
emergency is in effect.167  The fund is designed to supplement, not supplant, other 
financial resources available for public health activities.168
The PHSA was amended in June 2002 specifically for the purpose of enhancing 
the United States’ preparedness for a large-scale public health emergency.169 In addition 
to the Public Health Emergency Fund,170 the Response Act contains a number of 
provisions earmarking federal funds for preparation for a public health emergency.  There 
are funds earmarked for assessing national needs to combat threats to the public health,171
for grants to States or local authorities to assess public health threats,172 for grants to 
improve State and local public health agency preparedness,173 for grants to improve State, 
local, and hospital preparedness for a public health emergency,174 and for grants for 
community-hospital partnerships to prepare for a public health emergency.175   For fiscal 
year 2003, over 1.6 billion dollars in federal funds was allocated for these purposes.176
The funds can be expended for a variety of planning and preparedness functions, 
165
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including response training for health care professionals, enhancing worker safety in the 
event of a bioterror attack, and simulations and exercises to test the capability and 
timeliness of public health emergency responses.177
The Response Act also enhanced the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 
which is specifically designed to augment the country’s emergency medical response
capability during a public health emergency.178 The NDMS may be activated by the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to provide medical services 
to the victims of a public health emergency, even if a public health emergency has not 
been declared under the PHSA.179   Private hospitals may voluntarily join the NDMS by 
entering into an agreement with NDMS.180   Hospitals agreeing to join NDMS agree to 
commit a number of their available acute-care beds for NDMS patients.181  The number 
of beds committed may be adjusted at will by the hospital, even after the NDMS is 
activated.182 To date, approximately 1,818 hospitals have committed approximately 
110,605 acute-care beds to the NDMS program.183 Although at first glance, this sounds 
promising, even in a normal year flu patients occupy over 114,000 hospital beds.184
Obviously, hospitals are not eagerly lining up to contribute beds to the NDMS in 
sufficient numbers to make a even a dent in the bed capacity that will be needed in even a 
moderate influenza pandemic, of the type modeled by the Centers for Disease Control.185
177 Id.
178
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It appears that further incentives are necessary to enlist sufficient numbers of hospitals 
for the NDMS to have any real effect during a public health emergency.
One reason for the lackluster hospital response to the NDMS might be financial.  
Although hospitals that admit NDMS patients are assured that they will be reimbursed by 
the federal government, the only reimbursement contemplated is for the actual 
expenditures incurred in furtherance of the program.186 The legislation authorizing 
appropriations to pay for the program does not specify a method for calculating the 
amounts that will be paid to hospitals for each bed occupied by an NDMS patient.  It is 
left to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide the resources necessary to 
reimburse expenditures carried out in furtherance of the program.187 A hospital might 
easily decide that the reimbursement contemplated is too uncertain for it to take the risks 
associated with designating beds as NDMS beds, and making itself an attractive isolation 
or quarantine center in the event of a pandemic.  Without any understanding of what 
payment will be made for beds committed to the NDMS, hospitals are likely to decline to 
join the NDMS, or quickly withdraw their beds from the program at the start of an 
emergency, if beds are filled with more lucrative paying patients at that time.  Even if its 
beds are not filled, hospitals are unlikely to want to run the risk of losing whatever more 
lucrative business they do have at the beginning of a pandemic by designating empty 
beds to the NDMS and running the risk that their elective surgery and orthopedic 
patients, whose payors bear the brunt of the cost-shifting done by hospitals, will need to 
be relocated to other hospitals.
3. Federal Administrative Preparations for Public Health Emergencies
186
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Although there is an enormous amount of money earmarked for public health 
emergency preparedness through these legislative schemes, there is confusion about the 
amount and character of funds earmarked for actual direct payment to health care 
providers responding to a public health emergency. And there is no money allocated by 
the federal government for providers to deal with the economic aftermath of a pandemic. 
For example, in November 2005, the President released the National Strategy for 
Pandemic Influenza, coupled with a request to Congress for $7.1 billion in funding.188
The request included $251 million to detect and contain outbreaks before they spread 
around the world; $2.8 billion to accelerate development of cell-culture technology; $800 
million for development of new treatments and vaccines; $1.519 billion for the 
Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Defense to purchase influenza 
vaccines; $1.029 billion to stockpile antiviral medications; and $644 million to ensure 
that all levels of government are prepared to respond to a pandemic outbreak.189  Along 
with the National Strategy, the Department of Health and Human Services released its 
more detailed Pandemic Influenza Plan.  HHS’s Pandemic Influenza Plan provides 
further details of how the bounty of federal preparedness funds authorized in response to 
the President’s request are to be expended.190 The Plan sets forth a detailed operational 
framework for prevention, preparedness, evaluation, response, containment and recovery 
from an influenza pandemic.191 It specifically describes who is responsible for what 
activities amongst the various federal agencies with overlapping responsibilities in the 
area of public health.
188
 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and Funding Request, available at
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In contrast to this specificity for responsibilities during a public health emergency, 
the Plan is very vague about whose obligation it is to pay for care once a public health 
emergency is declared, and through what agency the money will flow. This vagueness is 
echoed in the more general Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for Public Health and 
Medical Emergencies that was previously promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services.192 CONOPS merely states that funding for the activities described in the 
Plan will be provided through direct and supplemental appropriations and 
reimbursements.193 CONOPS also notes that the States could be made to reimburse the 
federal government for certain activities carried out during a public health emergency 
under the PHSA, setting the stage for widespread wrangling about payment 
responsibilities not only between private insurers and the government, providers and local 
authorities, local authorities and state agencies, and between state agencies themselves, 
but between the federal government and the states as well.194 The knowledge that even 
the states and the federal government have not agreed on who will pay for care during a 
public health emergency is hardly an incentive for swift provider compliance with local 
public health authority orders that the provider knows will cause it economic injury. 
As far as the economic aftermath of a public health emergency is concerned, the 
discussion of recovery in CONOPS is limited to a brief statement regarding demobilizing 
the Secretary’s Emergency Response Team, and an assurance that there are medical and 
mental health services available to agency workers after deployment.195 Consistent with 
the federal statutory assumption that a public health emergency is a short-lived, limited 
192 CONOPS, supra note 162.
193 Id. at 8.
194 Id. at 9.
195 Id. at 14.
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scope phenomenon and that direct provision of medical care is a primarily local concern, 
CONOPS does little to address the after-effects of a public health emergency on the 
nation’s health care delivery system, economic or otherwise.
C. State and local authorities
The authority to isolate or quarantine in the event of a public health emergency
varies widely from state to state.196 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
(MSEHPA) provides some common ground for assessing the availability of 
compensation from state and local public health authorities for hospitals following the 
orders of authorities during a public health emergency.197 The MSEHPA specifies that 
compensation for property taken by a public health authority during a public health 
emergency shall be calculated in accordance with the applicable laws of eminent domain 
in a non-emergent situation.198 Unless a state’s constitution has been interpreted to 
provide compensation beyond that contemplated under the United States Constitution in a 
temporary regulatory taking situation, a hospital located in a state that follows the 
MSEHPA would thus find itself in the constitutional Takings Clause netherworld
described in Part ___, supra., after acting as an isolation or quarantine center during a 
pandemic.
States that have not adopted this provision of the MSEHPA do not necessarily 
have laws that are more likely than the MSEHPA to assure hospital compliance with 
orders of public health authorities. For example, New Jersey, the most densely populated 
196
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state with a population of over 8.5 million people, considers itself to be particularly 
vulnerable to the importation and spread of infectious disease.199  Over half a million 
people commute between New York and New Jersey every day, making the interstate 
spread of disease during a pandemic very likely in the region.200 Recognizing its potential 
vulnerability to an influenza pandemic, New Jersey has a lengthy and detailed draft 
Influenza Pandemic Plan.201 The Plan was developed in close collaboration with partner 
organizations throughout the state, and reviewed by both public and private sector 
stakeholders.202 The Plan recognizes that because of the likely scope and duration of an 
influenza pandemic, it will be difficult to shift resources between states, and the state 
must plan to be self-reliant.203 The Plan acknowledges that influenza prophylaxis and 
treatment during a pandemic will predominantly be the responsibility of individuals and 
organizations in the private sector, and that voluntary compliance by the private sector 
with guidelines and directives from governmental agencies is needed.204 New Jersey also 
acknowledges that the pre-pandemic period is the critical period for determining the 
impact of the pandemic on health care resources.205
Despite the apparent awareness of New Jersey public health authorities that 
cooperation from the private health care sector will be critical in a public health 
emergency, the Plan contains no provisions for alleviating the immediate or long-term 
economic impact the private health care sector is likely to experience from treating
199
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victims of an influenza pandemic.206 In fact, the plan acknowledges that the economic 
impact of an influenza pandemic will be significant, but then states that this is not within 
the purview of the public health response plan.207 The closest the Plan comes to 
addressing the problem is a promise that the New Jersey Department of Health and 
Senior Services Office of the State Epidemiologist will coordinate a state-wide effort to 
assess the impact of the pandemic on health care resources and prepare a report with 
recommendations for the future when the pandemic is over.208
It is doubtful that the assurance that the authorities will prepare a report with 
recommendations will be sufficient to persuade hospitals and other first responders to 
comply with the orders of public health authorities designating them as isolation or 
quarantine centers.  The New Jersey Constitution’s Takings Clause has been construed to 
be coextensive with the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause. 209  Given the 
uncertainty that compensation will be available to hospitals from traditional takings 
clause analysis, this is a recipe for defiance rather than cooperation in the event of a 
pandemic.
California, a populous state in close proximity to Asia and a large immigrant population, 
acknowledges that a pandemic is likely to affect everyone in California, and that no 
amount of planning will allow response to a major pandemic to be “business as usual.”210
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The California Department of Health, in its Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and 
Response Plan, estimates that 35% of the population could become ill with influenza in 
the event of a pandemic, and that there could be more than 35,000 deaths.211 The 
Department of Health acknowledges that a pandemic could continue for months, or even 
years, and will require a sustained health facility response.212 The Plan’s objectives for 
healthcare planning are to maintain to the greatest extent possible the provision of 
healthcare services sufficient to meet the needs of all Californians during an influenza 
pandemic, as well as respond to the healthcare needs of pandemic victims and coordinate 
that response amongst providers.213 In order to accomplish this, the public health 
authorities are exploring their legal authority to require hospitals to cancel elective 
surgeries or otherwise develop capacity in anticipation of a pandemic.214 Yet the Plan 
says nothing about assuring private sector health care providers that they will be 
compensated for the economic damage they are likely to experience if they comply with 
the orders of public health authorities designating them as isolation or quarantine centers.
The California Supreme Court has characterized a “somewhat broader” range of 
valuation for property taken by the government under the California Constitution, but 
otherwise, the state and federal Takings Clauses are construed identically.215 Without 
any financial assurances beyond the vagaries of litigation under the Takings Clause,
private hospitals are likely to succumb to the “not in my backyard” syndrome, and do 
whatever they can to avoid being associated with the pandemic, at least in the critical 
early stages.
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IV. ENSURING THAT HOSPITALS ACT IN THE INTERESTS OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH DURING A PANDEMIC
Current law is inadequate to ensure that hospitals will be completely compensated 
if they comply with the orders of public health authorities during the critical early stages 
of an infectious disease pandemic.  Thus, it does nothing to encourage provider 
compliance with such orders in the face of countervailing economic self-interests.  In 
order to be reassured that they will not be forced out of business if they comply with such 
orders, hospitals must be assured of three things: that they will be paid for the actual 
costs of caring for victims of a pandemic; that they will be paid for lost revenue from 
disruption of their routine business and their inability to cost-shift while designated as an 
isolation or quarantine center; and that they will receive adequate compensation after the 
pandemic is over to make up for the loss of goodwill they are likely to face due to being
designated as the “pesthouse” during a pandemic.  If we can ensure that these three 
elements loss will be compensated, we can ensure that our hospital managers will act in 
the public interest in the face of a pandemic, rather than act contrary to the public interest 
in the interests of economic self-preservation.  We can ensure that we will still have a 
functioning health care delivery system after the pandemic is over.  The remainder of this 
article proposes that an efficient way to provide these three elements of compensation to 
hospitals and ensure the public’s health is through collaboration between the public and 
the private sectors, taking advantage of their respective areas of expertise. 
A. Amending Current Disaster and Emergency Laws to Assure Prompt 
Payment for the Direct Costs of Care
During the thick of a public health emergency, quick economic relief to hospitals 
is of paramount importance.  Our existing emergency and disaster relief laws should 
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clearly provide for direct payments to hospitals in the throes of dealing with pandemic 
disease, regardless of whether they are acting pursuant to a Stafford Act declaration or 
pursuant to the orders of local public health officials.  After the crisis has been alleviated, 
the law should provide for the government to recoup costs that it expended  caring for 
sick patients from private health insurers who should have covered the costs of caring for 
their sick beneficiaries under the terms of their contracts with providers.  This will 
prevent insurers from receiving a windfall at the expense of the public, and postpone the 
inevitable arguing about who is responsible for payment for the treatment of pandemic 
victims until the pandemic subsides and the immediate public health crisis is over.
Although federal and state laws are full of preparedness initiatives, and substantial 
funding from all levels of government has been directed towards preparedness, confusion 
reigns about who will pay for what when pandemic victims are actually hospitalized.216
Although some hospitals have accumulated large reserves in recent years, and may be 
able to handle the disruption in their revenue streams that will inevitably occur when they 
are responding to a pandemic, many hospitals operate at the edge of solvency.217 In order 
to ensure that hospitals and other first responders have funds readily available to survive 
the interruption of their normal revenue streams, Congress should implement legislation 
earmarking some of the dollars allocated for influenza and pandemic preparedness for a 
reserve fund designed to pay for the care of pandemic victims as it is rendered.  In 
keeping with the philosophy expressed in ESF 8 that arranging for medical care is 
primarily a local function, and to ensure that the federal government does not encroach 
216 See Steven D. Gravely and Erin S. Whaley, Emergency Preparedness and Response:  Legal Issues in a 
Changing World, 17 THE HEALTH LAWYER Vol. 3 at 1 (June 2005).
217 See Monty Veazey, A Growing Crisis, MODERN HEALTHCARE, August 22, 2005 at 32.  Veazey notes 
that in Georgia, on average, the non-profit hospitals lose more than $1 million per year in operating 
income, and three of the five largest hospitals in the state are running at negative operating margins.
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on state police powers that are reserved to the states, the reserves could be held at the 
state and local level in secure, interest-bearing accounts, and access could be limited to 
the chief public health official of a political subdivision.  With the knowledge that funds 
to compensate them are actually available and under the control of the local chief public 
health official, it is far more likely that hospitals will comply with the orders of that 
official and perform their duties without resistance.218  If the payment level associated 
with the treatment of pandemic victims is sufficient, hospitals and other first responders 
may even be eager to carry out the orders of public health authorities as part of their 
charitable missions, rather than reluctantly complying.
In order to be effective, the payment made to a hospital for each pandemic victim 
treated must be sufficient to at least cover the hospital’s costs of care.  The payment must
include compensation for any “combat pay” the hospital must offer its staff to get them to 
care for pandemic victims.  State Medicaid payment levels, for instance, would be 
insufficient to ensure compliance.219 Federal legislation establishing reserve accounts 
should specify that the payment rates established by local public health authorities must 
compensate for the actual costs of providing care for patients with symptoms similar to 
pandemic victims (to the extent comparisons are possible), as well as additional costs that 
are likely to be incurred by the hospital in providing medical personnel to care for such 
patients, such as incentive bonuses to staff.  Setting the rates will require careful study of 
218
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the rates paid by various insurers to hospitals caring for their beneficiaries with specific 
conditions or illnesses, the costs of providing this care, and the prevailing wages paid to 
medical personnel in the area.  Much of this data is currently gathered by the Department 
of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, for use in 
setting hospital Medicare reimbursement.220  Additional research in the area could be 
funded by the federal government as part of emergency preparedness activities.
B. Insuring Against the Loss of the Ability to Cost-Shift During a Pandemic
It would be sound public policy to encourage hospitals to view the risks of loss 
associated with infectious disease pandemics as they view other risks of loss from natural 
disasters, such as fire and flood, and prepare ahead of time for such losses by insuring for 
them. Many businesses purchase private “business interruption insurance” to protect 
themselves from the risks of interruptions to their revenue streams due to natural or man-
made disasters.  
Private business interruption insurance is designed to indemnify an insured 
against losses arising from an inability to operate a commercial establishment in a normal 
manner because of a natural or man-made disaster. 221  Currently, the majority of such 
policies limit coverage to interruptions from events for which an insurer has significant 
actuarial experience, such as fire, flood, tornado, or hurricane.222  And even then, the 
insurance is only triggered by physical damage to the policyholder’s property, and only 
covers the insured for the time period necessary to rebuild, replace, or repair physical 
220 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. §1395ww (2005) (describing methodology for calculating payments to hospitals 
for inpatient services, including calculation of the wage index and cost report amounts).
221 See Robert T. Horst and Mark Rosenberg, Successful Use of the Examination Under Oath Policy 
Provision and the Evaluation of the Time Element Claim, 1 MEALEY’S BUSINESS INTERRUPTION 
INSURANCE (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.mealeys.com/biscom.html.
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damage to property.223  Standard business interruption insurance would therefore be 
useless to a hospital faced with the loss of its revenue stream from its most lucrative lines 
of day-to-day business (such as elective surgeries) because of a designation as an 
isolation or quarantine center, rather than due to some physical damage to the facility.
Therefore, in order for the compensation scheme to work, state insurance 
regulators would have to mandate the terms of business interruption insurance that 
insurers must offer to hospitals. They would have to disapprove any policy language that 
excludes coverage for losses incurred due to compliance with the orders of public health 
authorities, and thus create  “public health emergency business interruption insurance” 
(PHEBII) available to hospitals.
Although state mandating of the terms of PHEBII is a necessary first step, it is 
highly unlikely that it will suffice to create a private market in PHEBII on its own. The 
private insurance market has already demonstrated its unwillingness to insure against 
risks associated with public health emergencies and threats of infectious disease 
pandemics; risks that have historically been perceived as a government problem.224 For 
example, in 1976, believing that a potentially deadly influenza pandemic of swine flu was 
imminent, the federal government undertook a national swine flu vaccine program.225
Almost immediately, the vaccine manufacturers’ insurers refused to provide liability 
insurance to the manufacturers for adverse effects associated with the vaccine.226
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Concerned about the potentially enormous numbers of claims and uncertain of the 
amounts associated with the claims due to lack of prior claims experience, private 
insurers took the position that if the public was endangered, then the government should 
take the risk.227  Congress, however, was unconvinced that it should do so.  Ultimately, 
the impasse was broken when Congress passed legislation committing the federal 
government to insuring the swine flu vaccine manufacturers against claims that the 
vaccine injured people.228
There is no reason to believe that private insurers will react differently to being 
told by state regulators to cover a business interruption due to a public health emergency 
than they reacted during the swine flu public health emergency.  And after a public health 
emergency occurs, insurance for its effects will likely be virtually impossible to obtain at 
any price, just as terrorism insurance was virtually unavailable in the days following 
9/11, even at very high prices.229 Faced with state insurance regulation forcing them to 
take what they consider unknowable and unquantifiable risk, business interruption
insurers are likely to pull out of the market in a particular state rather than comply, 
leaving the hospitals in the state no better off than they were before state coverage 
mandates were instituted.
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After 9/11, in response to the private market’s refusal to provide terrorism 
insurance, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA).230  The 
TRIA is a useful model for the public-private collaboration contemplated by the PHEBII 
proposed in this article.    Under the TRIA any person who offers property or casualty 
insurance in the United States must offer terrorism insurance as well.231 To address
concerns that the government was mandating the insurance industry to take an 
unknowable, unquantifiable amount of risk, and responding to threats that insurers would 
pull out of the market completely, the TRIA also provides federal reinsurance for losses 
incurred by the insurers due to terrorism after payment of a significant deductible 
amount.232  The insurers must also pay a 10% coinsurance above the deductible for 2006, 
rising to 15% in 2007, before government funding is available.233  Total public and 
private liability for losses due to terrorism is capped at $100 billion.234  Federal 
compensation is only available when the Secretaries of the Treasury and State certify that 
an “act of terrorism” has occurred, and only if industry insured losses nationwide exceed 
$50 million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007.235  The government will recoup a 
significant amount of any payments it makes for terrorism losses through a surcharge on 
property and casualty policyholders, regardless of whether or not the policyholders have 
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purchased terrorism insurance.236  The TRIA has been embraced by the insurance 
industry, who lobbied for its extension for an additional two years.237
Legislation similar to the TRIA could be used to ensure that hospitals are insured 
against losses of revenue due to pandemics and their compliance with the orders of public 
health officials during a pandemic.  Such legislation would require all purveyors of 
business interruption insurance to offer PHEBII, yet take much of the sting out of the 
requirement by having the federal government insure the insurance industry against 
excess risk.  Unlike the TRIA, which does not require a policyholder to purchase 
terrorism insurance, in the exercise of their police power and to safeguard our health care 
delivery system, states could and should require hospitals to purchase PHEBII as part of 
their licensure requirements. Naturally occurring infectious disease pandemics, unlike 
mass terrorist events, are relatively predictable occurrences.  Although each pandemic 
differs with regard to its penetration and mortality rates among the general public, we 
have sufficient experience with infectious disease and projections of costs for actuaries to 
use for initial premium calculations.  Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to require 
hospitals to purchase PHEBII, and many of the criticisms that have been levied against 
the TRIA because of the unquantifiable nature of risks associated with terrorism are less
applicable to losses associated with a more predictable pandemic.
This public reinsurer-private insurer collaboration minimizes many of the 
problems inherent in a private insurance scheme. Requiring hospitals to purchase PHEBII
eliminates any possibility of adverse selection.  “Adverse selection” refers to the tendency 
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of only high-risk customers to purchase available insurance.238 Without a mandatory 
purchase requirement, it is highly likely that only hospitals that are most likely to become 
isolation or quarantine centers would decide to purchase PHEBII.239  This would 
artificially inflate the premiums charged for the insurance, and prevent insurers from 
spreading the risk amongst a balanced cross-section of the nation’s hospitals, urban and 
rural, large and small.  In the absence of a requirement of universal purchase of PHEBII 
by hospitals, when there is a pandemic, the insurers would be likely to have to pay an 
enormous amount of claims, and will go out of business.240  Requiring hospitals to 
purchase PHEBII as a condition of licensure protects the hospitals, the insurers, and the 
public, and will keep the rates affordable by allowing the insurers to properly spread risk.
The problem of adverse selection may be minimal anyway in the context of 
PHEBII because of the inherent random nature of an infectious disease pandemic.  
Typically, adverse selection occurs because the policyholder has information, that the 
insurer does not have, suggesting that an insurable event is likely to occur.241  The insurer 
cannot adjust the premium rates to reflect the appropriate level of risk without this 
information, and thus, winds up paying out far more than it anticipated.  In contrast, 
hospitals have no more knowledge about where and when a pandemic could occur than 
potential insurers.  Because the insureds and the insurers are on a level playing field as 
far as knowing the where, when, and magnitude of a potential pandemic, there would 
probably be less adverse selection in the context of this type of private takings insurance 
than in other types of insurance, even if hospitals were not required to purchase PHEBII.
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Another commonly discussed problem in private insurance is moral hazard.242
Moral hazard occurs in the insurance marketplace when the insured can take action that 
affects the probability or the magnitude of the event that triggers an insurance 
payment.243 A classic example is a landowner with a fire insurance policy who becomes 
less diligent in clearing combustibles away from his house.244 In the context of PHEBII, 
an insurer might be concerned that a hospital suffering financially would do something to 
make it more likely that the insurer will have to pay under the insurance policy, such as 
failing to resist designation as an isolation or quarantine center.245 Unlike the typical 
moral hazard situation, in the context of pandemic preparedness, this is actually a 
desirable outcome from a public health perspective.
The public-private collaborative nature of this model also eliminates many of the 
problems inherent in a purely public compensation scheme.  One of the major problems 
that appears when the government institutes a scheme of publicly funded compensation 
for some perceived social ill is the phenomenon of rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking occurs 
when a constituent who may be entitled to a payout under a public compensation scheme 
uses political or other means to try to fit all adverse events that affect the constituent 
within the category of adverse events for which the scheme is designed to compensate.246
In the context of PHEBII, the danger is that insurers will attempt to fit all outbreaks of 
infectious disease into the category of a major pandemic, so that the reinsurance 
provisions of the legislation would be triggered.  This propensity towards rent-seeking, 
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however, will be quashed by the existence of a substantial deductible and coinsurance 
that must be paid by the insurer before any federal assistance becomes available.247  Only 
in a truly dangerous and costly pandemic situation, where the economic losses are high 
enough to dwarf the payout that the private insurers will make via their deductibles, 
would it be worth the insurers’ while to seek reinsurance.  In such a situationm, the 
government will likely have already declared a state of public health emergency.
C. Interpreting the Takings Clause to Require Compensation for Lost Goodwill 
and Going Concern Value After a Pandemic
In addition to ensuring that hospitals comply with public health dictates during a 
pandemic, it is in the public’s interest to ensure that we have a functioning health care 
delivery system after the pandemic ends.  Congress and state legislatures should pass 
legislation requiring compensation for provable loss of goodwill and going concern value 
when the government effects a temporary regulatory taking of a going business concern 
to protect the public health.  
The loss that a hospital faces when it is designated as an isolation or quarantine 
center is not only the loss of its ability to cost-shift during and after a pandemic, but also
the lingering damage to the hospital’s reputation caused by such a designation.  Such a 
loss is not insignificant.  With regard to the SARS epidemic of 2003, hospital counsel has 
opined that “the mere mention of SARS in the same sentence with the name of a specific 
health care facility can create panic among patients and families, and cause significant 
damage to the facility’s reputation as well as its ability to continue to treat patients.”248
For the majority of hospitals, which depend on the ability to attract privately insured 
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patients to subsidize care for publicly insured and uninsured patients, such a stigma could 
mean the difference between continued existence and shutting the hospital’s doors.
We are unlikely to be able to change the public’s attitude towards isolation and 
quarantine facilities through law.  But we can change the law to compensate hospitals and 
other first responders so they can survive until the public’s memory of a pandemic and 
association of the hospital with the pandemic dissipates. The Takings Clause is a 
reflection of society’s acknowledgement that if the government takes away a person’s 
private property for the benefit of society, then society as a whole should pay.249  The 
United States Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the Takings Clause is “to bar 
the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”250 No government action 
could yield a greater benefit to society than a taking to ensure that the public’s health is 
protected, and that the sick are cared for. If any burden should in fairness and justice be 
borne by the public as a whole, it should be the burden of protecting the public’s health.
When the government takes a hospital for use as an isolation or quarantine center 
during a public health emergency, it is taking not only the real property, equipment, and 
physical improvements to the property.  It is counting on the expertise of the hospital’s 
staff and the hospital’s reputation as a provider of quality health care to assure the public 
that the situation is under control.  As such, the government is taking and using the 
hospital’s goodwill for the duration of the emergency.  Under established Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, the government pays for what it gets and what it can and does use.  It is 
not much of a stretch to require compensation for goodwill in such a circumstance.
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  And when the emergency is over, because of the stigma attached to a place 
where there has been a concentration of infectious disease, the government has used up or 
destroyed the hospital’s goodwill. This leaves the hospital owners with no alternatives 
but to start over, without the goodwill that they spent many years creating.  The Model 
Eminent Domain Code recognizes that in situations where loss of goodwill is caused by 
the taking of the property, cannot reasonably be prevented by relocating the business or 
taking other reasonable steps, and will not be otherwise compensated, the business owner 
should be compensated for the loss.251 It is consistent with the intent of the Takings 
Clause for Congress and state legislatures to mandate that loss of goodwill be considered 
compensable property when a hospital is designated by the public health authorities as an 
isolation or quarantine center.  Legislation requiring compensation for goodwill in such a 
situation will remove the uncertainty inherent in leaving the determination of whether any 
compensation will be paid for loss of goodwill to the courts.  It will also act as a check on 
rash or unfounded action by the government that adversely affects hospitals, but does 
little to further the public’s health, such as the premature designation of a hospital as an 
isolation facility.
Even with such legislation, the government and the hospital may disagree about 
the amount of compensation due the hospital because of the government’s actions. To 
further minimize uncertainty over the potential amount of compensation for lost 
goodwill, and to minimize the expenses and vagaries inherent in using the courts to 
determine this amount, Congress could earmark a proportion of the emergency 
preparedness funds now being expended to commission studies on the effects of prior 
epidemics on public attitudes towards hospitals in nations that suffered from epidemics in 
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recent years, and develop projections of the effects of a pandemic on the goodwill of 
American hospitals.  The projections could be used to develop a table for compensating 
hospitals for loss of goodwill based on the size, type, and location of the hospital, and the 
severity of the pandemic.  A mediation or arbitration mechanism could be included in the 
legislation to resolve any claims by a particular hospital that the table does not 
completely compensate it for the government’s actions.252  The assurance that payment 
for lost goodwill is mandated provided the hospital can prove the loss, coupled with the 
uninterrupted revenue stream provided the hospital during the public health emergency 
through the emergency reserve fund and PHEBII discussed above, would be a giant step 
towards ensuring that hospitals have no reason to shy away from designations as isolation 
or quarantine centers.  
V. CONCLUSION
We know it is not a matter of if, but of when, an infectious disease pandemic will 
strike the United States.  We can place our reliance on the wonders of modern medicine, 
and the good intentions and charitable missions of our institutional and individual health 
care providers, to ensure that we are cared for when we are sick, and hope for the best.  
Chances are that we will be cared for in some fashion during the immediate crisis of a 
public health emergency.  But given the state of our crumbling health care safety net, the 
increase in the number of for-profit hospitals in the country, and the paper-thin margins 
on which many of the nation’s hospitals operate, chances are that hospitals will resist any 
order to take actions that are harmful to their bottom lines.  This instinct for economic 
self-preservation could endanger the public’s health and rob us of our best chance to 
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minimize or avoid the most severe consequences of a pandemic.  And even if they 
comply with the orders of public health authorities, it is likely that when the immediate 
crisis passes, many of the hospitals that the most poor and vulnerable of our citizens rely 
on to provide them with care will not survive the economic damage caused by the actions 
they took and the choices they made in the public interest.
During the past decade, our federal, state, and local governments have 
acknowledged the need for preparedness in the face of a public health emergency by 
passing legislation allocating large amounts of money to “preparedness” activities.  
Recognizing the need for public health emergency preparedness is a good thing.  
Nevertheless, despite this sudden cascade of resources for planning activities, our 
nation’s hospitals are in no better position to economically survive a public health
emergency than they were before the resources appeared.  As Justice Brandeis has 
observed, “[v]alue is a word of many meanings.”253  Rather than continuing to beef up 
our bureaucracies and filter dollars through layers of government in the name of 
“emergency preparedness,” Congress and state legislatures could get better value for our 
dollars by using the existing public health bureaucracy and the expertise of private 
insurers to set up a system that ensures that our first responders will actually be available
during a public health emergency, will be provide the care needed by the public, and will 
survive the emergency to continue to provide the care the public needs in the future.
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